INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS, OBJECTIVITY AND THE ELISION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSENT REACHED THROUGH CONCESSION AND COMPROMISE DAVID CABRELLI

Solicitor and Lecturer in Commercial Law
School of Law
University of Edinburgh
Introduction
To what extent do 'consent' and 'intention' continue to have a role to play in the process of construing the terms of contracts? Is the adoption of an increasingly objective approach towards the interpretative process consistent with an assertion that it can be equiparated to the marginalisation of the role of consent? If the dynamics of concession and compromise in commercial negotiations are facets of party consent, in what way may (if at all) the prevalence of the commercially sensible construction function to elide consensus? These are some of the questions which this paper will attempt to address. Since contract law is one of the vessels through which voluntary obligations are constituted and channelled and a contract involves the exercise by an obligor of his will and an expression of his intention to be bound, 1 one might think that the consent and intention of obligor and obligee would be fundamentally crucial to the construction of the terms encapsulating those obligations and duties. However, the courts have routinely stressed that the search for the true construction of the terms of written or oral contracts is concerned more about what the reasonable objective person would consider the mutual intentions of the parties to be rather than what they had intended to agree subjectively (individually or collectively). One of the principal merits of the objective approach is said to be that it avoids unjust results generated from 'unfair surprise' and protects the reasonable reliance interests of the parties to the contract and those whose rights, duties and liabilities may be affected by it. 2 On the other hand, the requirement to construe the terms of a commercial contract from # Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop entitled attempt to ascertain the meaning of the terms agreed by the parties in the contract in accordance with what the parties thought they had intended to say at the time agreement was reached. The subjective approach is consistent with the 'will theory', i.e. that where there is a dispute, duly reflecting the consensual nature of a contract, the interpretative process must be focussed on the need to ascertain the collective intentions of the parties. 9 However, by the time of Bell's writings, the interpretative process had begun to drift away from a purely subjective approach towards the determination of the 'mutual intentions' 10 of the parties. As noted by Sir Christopher As explained by Laura Macgregor, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 'remnants of a subjective approach [we]re difficult to find' 13 and Scots law in this period is characterised by an incremental gravitation towards an objective approach rather than a clearly recognisable and well-defined break from the subjective stance.
However, the approach could not be categorised as fully 100 per cent objective in 15 the Scottish courts appeared to be confined to looking at the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract where the scope of application of the words was unclear, the words were capable of more than one interpretation, or they were latently ambiguous, i.e. the words or expressions deployed in the written commercial contract appeared to be clear, but the surrounding circumstances pointed to the presence of an ambiguity. 16 By and large, in the cases decided according to Scots law prior to Investors Compensation Scheme the interpretative process was generally characterised by references to the natural and ordinary meaning which the words employed duly conveyed -which was a matter of 'impression' 17 or dictionary definition. In theory at least, the courts were only allowed to look at the factual matrix and circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract where it had held that the words possessed no plain meaning. The upshot of this analysis is that one might consider Scots law as possessing two
(not necessarily opposing) streams of authority travelling in parallel directions.
However, this would perhaps be stretching the true position too far, since whether a court adopts the first or the second approach is unlikely to make a great deal of difference to the outcome. Indeed, it is more the case that is: "A matter of choice whether a judge in his reasoning first analyses the background facts before considering the relevant contractual provisions or looks first at the provision before testing his view of it against those facts". 40 Nevertheless, on balance, it is submitted that the primacy of the surrounding circumstances and the application of the commercially sensible construction as the principal interpretative instruments is a paramount consideration, so that whilst the position in Scots law is not wholly free from doubt, the writer would adopt the description advanced by Macgregor which Ltd., 43 the end result is that the factual matrix, surrounding circumstances and commercially sensible construction all operate at the forefront of the interpretative process rather than lurking somewhere towards the background.
What is the distinction between a subjective and objective approach?
At this juncture, it is perhaps beneficial to pause, take a step back and subject the distinction between a subjective and objective approach to much closer scrutiny.
44
The oft-versed assertion, which one would suggest is more of a caricature than a reality, is that legal systems based on the civilian tradition such as Germany, A 100 per cent subjective examination can be contrasted with a purely objective approach. In strict terms, a determination which is 100 per cent objective would empower the court to substitute its own judgment as to what was expressed for that of the parties. [66] . also empower the court to completely disregard the views and understandings of the contracting parties themselves. In such an extreme case, party autonomy, consent and intention would be completely overridden and it is clear that this is not what is happening where the current rules of interpretation are applied by the courts. At this juncture, it should also be noted that if one were to chart the subjective/objective spectrum, this would not coincide with another spectrum ranging from a 100 per cent literal construction at one end of the scale to a 100 per cent contextual approach at the other end (insofar as it is possible to conceive of the interpretative process as flowing seamlessly in terms of such a spectrum at all). The subjective approach does not entail consideration of the text in isolation, but rather the process can be conceived as an exercise in delving into the heads of the contracting parties and identifying their genuine and honest beliefs. Likewise, whilst the application of an objective approach enjoins a court to engage with the context, this is not so radical as to grant a licence to the court to ignore the text of the contract. Instead, it is suggested that the relationship between subjective, objective, literal and contextual approaches is more subtle and can be drawn in terms of an irregularly shaped trapezium, which might be plotted in the following manner:
The question which arises is where the Scots law approach to contractual interpretation is located on the subjective/objective spectrum painted above. The answer is that it probably lies somewhere towards the right of the median, since it would be absurd to contend that the current law is devoid of any subjective considerations. Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the scrutiny applied by a court is to conceptualise it as involving the application of a 'strong' objective measure duly tempered by a 'weak' subjective strand. The approach is best understood as one which clings to a mixed subjective/objective approach since it is subjective to the extent that the focus on the surrounding circumstances relates to factors which pertained to the contracting parties at the time of formation and it is submitted that the successful application of such a technique will be exceptional which renders it unlikely that the interpretative process will be applied as a means of overriding the shared intention of the parties.
Another more compelling argument is that the current rules on contractual interpretation function to narrow the scope of relevance of the law of rectification.
The wider the scope of the interpretative task, the greater the ineffectiveness of the statutory provisions on rectification. 67 The contention is that the once neat and clean dividing line which existed between the role of the law of construction as an interpretative endeavour and the role of the law of rectification as performing a corrective and adaptive function appears to have collapsed. However, the very least that can be said at this point is that the techniques of construction and rectification cannot be distinguished by invoking the subjective/objective continuum which was explored above: It would be erroneous to assert that construction is more concerned about discovering the meaning which the terms of a document would convey to a reasonable and objective business outsider standing in the shoes of the contracting parties, whereas rectification is about the correction of defective expressions as a means of realising the subjective 'common' 68 and 'actual (not deemed)' 69 intentions of the contracting parties. Instead, if the two processes of construction and rectification were to be plotted on the subjective/objective spectrum, they would both be marked off at corresponding locations, since both entail the application of objective elements. The current approach to contractual interpretation adopted by the Scottish courts places great importance on the background knowledge which was, or ought reasonably to have been, available to the parties, the circumstances surrounding the inception of the contract, the whole matrix of facts and the commercially sensible construction. These factors undoubtedly enjoin a court to apply an objective measure of scrutiny to their task at hand. However, as has already been noted, this is duly constrained by the subjective element referred to above, i.e. the need for the objective business outsider to step into the shoes of the contracting parties. where the parties have adopted a 'private dictionary', the subjective meaning understood by the parties must be applied by the courts. 77 A similar rule is that special or technical words or terms should be construed according to that special or technical sense where this is the meaning understood by the parties. 78 Furthermore, terms which are understood as having a particular meaning through custom and usage ought to yield to that construction. 79 However, the hostility of the courts to the admissibility of documents which are reflective of the pre-contractual understandings of the parties, which was recently re- 86 Another difficulty lies in drawing the line between evidence which amounts to 'pre-contractual negotiations', which of course, is inadmissible and evidence which forms part of the surrounding circumstances or the parties' background knowledge, which indeed may be had regard to by a court. 87 Lord Hoffmann has attempted to argue that the threshold criterion between the two categories is equivalent to the distinction between objective and subjective material,
i.e. that the surrounding circumstances are objective, whereas prior communings are 'drenched in subjectivity'. 88 It is submitted that this appears to be a rather blunt and simplistic approach which may break down at the margins. 89 The same challenge of establishing a threshold criterion exists in drawing the distinction between evidence of subsequent conduct and surrounding circumstances. 90 These classificatory issues will continue to exist so long as material which is labelled as prior communings and subsequent conduct is deemed to be an irrelevant consideration. Indeed, in its recent Discussion Paper, the stance of the Scottish Law Commission was consistent with the abolition of the ban on pre-contractual communings and subsequent actings. arrangement. In such circumstances, the appropriate response may be to attach greater weight to the surrounding circumstances or alternatively, the text itself. In another case, the surrounding circumstances may reveal little, yet the commercial objective of a clause may be clear. 93 A further possibility is that both criteria may prove to shed no light whatsoever, in which case, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words will be applied. In such matters, the dynamics can be summarised in the layperson's motif of 'horses for courses'. Furthermore, a natural rein ought also to be placed on any potential excessive judicial creativity by the need to confine the scope of enquiries to the matters averred and narrated in the parties' written pleadings and the need for the court to adopt a construction which is reflective of the understanding of the reasonable person who has stepped into the shoes of the parties. Where two competing interpretations are equally plausible, the requirement to adopt the persona of the objective reasonable person should channel the court towards a process which examines their relative workability and the construction which is more workable than the other should be preferred. 94 However, the above is subject to a particular caveat. Lords Reed, Hodge and Menzies highlighted the fact that the courts need to be alive to the danger that the commercially sensible construction might be applied to supersede a bad bargain which has been agreed by a party through the dynamics of compromise and concession in the commercial negotiation process. 99 The writer would also add that this danger is compounded by the fact that the scope for concession and compromise to be revealed in court is constrained since evidence of developer to engage in-house professionals and consultants and so it was more or less inevitable that it would have to instruct outside third parties for professional advice.
To that extent, it may have been wholly legitimate for the JVCo to agree to indemnify 99 A matter also noted by the Scottish Law Commission An alternative objection to the prominence of the commercially sensible construction is that it assumes that the judiciary are sufficiently equipped to engage in commercial decision-making. It is suggested that this may be somewhat misplaced, something which the judiciary themselves have not been inhibited from reminding themselves in the past. 103 The writer would submit that the risk is that the construct of the commercially sensible construction develops into something of an 'unruly horse'
which cannot be reined in once the stable door has bolted.
Conclusion
For the reasons advanced in this paper, it is contended that the adoption of an increasingly objective approach towards the construction of contracts is not necessarily consistent with the marginalisation of the importance of the role of consent in contract law. However, this is subject to the peril that the commercially sensible construction may evolve into something which overshadows the other interpretative tools and operates to suppress the significance of consent articulated through concession and compromise. An altogether different and more pressing issue is the effect of the current approach to construction upon commercial certainty.
Amongst legal practitioners 104 and law and economics scholars, 105 the current objective approach is less than popular for the uncertainty and inefficiencies which it generates in commercial contracting. 106 The writer would end with the simple
